Eelco Visser: The Oregon Connection

This paper shares some memories of Eelco gathered over the past 25 years as a colleague and friend, and reflects on the nature of modern international collaborations

Static Conflict Detection for a Policy Language

We present a static control flow analysis used in the Simple Unified Policy Programming Language (SUPPL) compiler to detect internally inconsistent policies. For example, an access control policy can decide to both “allow” and “deny” access for a user; such an inconsistency is called a conflict. Policies in Suppl. follow the Event-Condition-Action paradigm; predicates are used to model conditions and event handlers are written in an imperative way. The analysis is twofold; it first computes a superset of all conflicts by looking for a combination of actions in the event handlers that might violate a user-supplied definition of conflicts. SMT solvers are then used to try to rule out the combinations that cannot possibly be executed. The analysis is formally proven sound in Coq in the sense that no actual conflict will be ruled out by the SMT solvers. Finally, we explain how we try to show the user what causes the conflicts, to make them easier to solve

Scopes Describe Frames: A Uniform Model for Memory Layout in Dynamic Semantics

Semantic specifications do not make a systematic connection between the names and scopes in the static structure of a program and memory layout, and access during its execution. In this paper, we introduce a systematic approach to the alignment of names in static semantics and memory in dynamic semantics, building on the scope graph framework for name resolution. We develop a uniform memory model consisting of frames that instantiate the scopes in the scope graph of a program. This provides a language-independent correspondence between static scopes and run-time memory layout, and between static resolution paths and run-time memory access paths. The approach scales to a range of binding features, supports straightforward type soundness proofs, and provides the basis for a language-independent specification of sound reachability-based garbage collection

Scopes Describe Frames: A Uniform Model for Memory Layout in Dynamic Semantics (Artifact)

Our paper introduces a systematic approach to the alignment of names in the static structure of a program, and memory layout and access during its execution. We develop a uniform memory model consisting of frames that instantiate the scopes in the scope graph of a program. This provides a language-independent correspondence between static scopes and run-time memory layout, and between static resolution paths and run-time memory access paths. The approach scales to a range of binding features, supports straightforward type soundness proofs, and provides the basis for a language-independent specification of sound reachability-based garbage collection. This Coq artifact showcases how our uniform model for memory layout in dynamic semantics provides structure to type soundness proofs. The artifact contains type soundness proofs mechanized in Coq for (supersets of) all languages in the paper. The type soundness proofs rely on a language-independent framework formalizing scope graphs and frame heaps

A Verified Information-Flow Architecture

SAFE is a clean-slate design for a highly secure computer system, with pervasive mechanisms for tracking and limiting information flows. At the lowest level, the SAFE hardware supports fine-grained programmable tags, with efficient and flexible propagation and combination of tags as instructions are executed. The operating system virtualizes these generic facilities to present an information-flow abstract machine that allows user programs to label sensitive data with rich confidentiality policies. We present a formal, machine-checked model of the key hardware and software mechanisms used to dynamically control information flow in SAFE and an end-to-end proof of noninterference for this model. We use a refinement proof methodology to propagate the noninterference property of the abstract machine down to the concrete machine level. We use an intermediate layer in the refinement chain that factors out the details of the information-flow control policy and devise a code generator for compiling such information-flow policies into low-level monitor code. Finally, we verify the correctness of this generator using a dedicated Hoare logic that abstracts from low-level machine instructions into a reusable set of verified structured code generators

Formalizing Stack Safety as a Security Property

The term stack safety is used to describe a variety of compiler, runtime, and hardware mechanisms for protecting stack memory. Unlike “the heap,” the ISA-level stack does not correspond to a single high-level language concept: different compilers use it in different ways to support procedural and functional abstraction mechanisms from a wide range of languages. This protean nature makes it difficult to nail down what it means to correctly enforce stack safety

Micro-Policies: Formally Verified, Tag-Based Security Monitors

Recent advances in hardware design have demonstrated mechanisms allowing a wide range of low-level security policies (or micro-policies) to be expressed using rules on metadata tags. We propose a methodology for defining and reasoning about such tag-based reference monitors in terms of a high-level “symbolic machine,” and we use this methodology to define and formally verify micro-policies for dynamic sealing, compartmentalization, control-flow integrity, and memory safety; in addition, we show how to use the tagging mechanism to protect its own integrity. For each micro-policy, we prove by refinement that the symbolic machine instantiated with the policy’s rules embodies a high-level specification characterizing a useful security property. Last, we show how the symbolic machine itself can be implemented in terms of a hardware rule cache and a software controller